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Abstract The difference between a non-living machine
such as a vacuum cleaner and a living organism as a lion
seems to be obvious. The two types of entities differ in
their material consistence, their origin, their development
and their purpose. This apparently clear-cut borderline has
previously been challenged by ﬁctitious ideas of ‘‘artiﬁcial
organism’’ and ‘‘living machines’’ as well as by progress in
technology and breeding. The emergence of novel tech-
nologies such as artiﬁcial life, nanobiotechnology and
synthetic biology are deﬁnitely blurring the boundary
between our understanding of living and non-living matter.
This essay discusses where, at the borderline between liv-
ing and non-living matter, we can position the future
products of synthetic biology that belong to the two hybrid
entities ‘‘synthetic organisms’’ and ‘‘living machines’’ and
how the approaching realization of such hybrid entities
affects our understanding of organisms and machines. For
this purpose we focus on the description of three different
types of synthetic biology products and the aims assigned
to their realization: (1) synthetic minimal cells aimed at by
protocell synthetic biology, (2) chassis organisms strived
for by synthetic genomics and (3) genetically engineered
machines produced by bioengineering. We argue that in the
case of synthetic biology the purpose is more decisive for
the categorization of a product as an organism or a machine
than its origin and development. This has certain ethical
implications because the deﬁnition of an entity as machine
seems to allow bypassing the discussion about the assign-
ment and evaluation of instrumental and intrinsic values,
which can be raised in the case of organisms.
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Introduction
The difference between living and non-living matter is not
only of great interest and challenge for science but also has
philosophical and cultural impact. The question whether the
living world is fundamentally different from the non-living
world has been widely discussed in natural philosophy.
Today the philosophical idea of vitalism, which says that
the organic world is governed by different principles than
non-living entities, is largely outdated. Nevertheless, even
with the knowledge that living organisms follow the same
chemical and physical laws as non-living matter but can
develop novel properties by emergence (Luisi 2006, Chap.
6), it can be argued that there are differences for example
between the traditional meaning of ‘‘living organism’’ and
that of ‘‘machine’’. Living organisms traditionally exist,
reproduce and change following natural rules, indepen-
dently of the will of human beings. In contrast, in the arti-
ﬁcial world human beings decide what exists, in what
amount and in which form. A strict separation between the
natural and the human-determined world has never existed,
domesticated animals being natural and dependent on
humans at the same time. However, living organisms
designed, produced and fully controlled by human beings
have been difﬁcult to imagine until recently. Attempts to
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since ancient times (Riskin 2007), but never led to some-
thing that would seriously be considered alive and yet not a
member of the natural
1 world. The rise of digital and bio-
logical technologies in the second half of the twentieth
century has allowed for novel approaches to artiﬁcial forms
of life. In vitro fertilization (IVF) allowed the fertilization
of a human egg and thereby the production of a human
embryo in the lab. Yet, the product of this procedure is still
controlled by a natural design and is in that respect not more
artiﬁcial than a naturally conceived human being. The
progress in computer technology has lead to the develop-
ment of disciplines called artiﬁcial life (AL) and artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI). Human beings can produce digital
‘‘organisms’’ that reproduce, evolve and learn and thereby
develop in unpredictable ways. They have life-like func-
tions, but given that these ‘‘organisms’’ do not exist phys-
ically but only in a virtual world, they are so fundamentally
different from natural life that there remains a clear
boundary between natural life and life-like entities pro-
duced by computer technology. Synthetic biology adds a
new chapter to the story of human-made life. Synthetic
biology is an emerging technology at the interface between
biotechnology, chemistry, engineering and computer sci-
ence. Very different types of outputs, from genetically
engineered bacteria to chemically synthesized genomes, to
chemically assembled cells or even computer models of an
artiﬁcial metabolism can all be considered intermediate- or
end-products of synthetic biology. This multidisciplinary
and multi-approach ﬁeld has the unifying goal of producing
and designing new forms of life (Deplazes 2009). In some
respects the IVF and AL approaches are combined in syn-
thetic biology. On the one hand, synthetic biologists use the
basic natural mechanisms for their products, which means
that they are trying to produce organic cellular structures
controlled by a genome. On the other hand, their products
should be regulated and controlled by a human design,
similarly to computers. Depending on the approach, one or
the other aspect (the usage of basic natural mechanisms as
in IVF or the control by a human design as in AL) is more
prominent. Interestingly, the aim of producing novel types
of living organisms in synthetic biology not only implies the
production of living from non-living matter, but also the
idea of using living matter and turning it into machines,
which are traditionally considered non-living.
It can be said that synthetic biology as a whole
approaches the borderline between living and non-living
matter from both sides, the living and the inanimate. In the
following, this borderline will be examined and the posi-
tion of different synthetic biology products in relation to
this border will be discussed.
Organisms and machines
In order to investigate the borderline between the living and
the non-living world in relation to the natural and artiﬁcial
world we will in the following introduce and compare
organisms and machines as representatives of natural and
artiﬁcial entities. We are aware of the fact that the term
machine is sometimes used in a metaphorical sense for nat-
ural objects
2 and some machines such as certain robots are
considered to be similar to living organisms. Furthermore,
we are aware that previous technologies have already initi-
ated the convergence of the two types of entities. However,
for the sake of a transparent argumentation we use the two
terms in their traditional meaning, which overlaps with the
common usage as described by the deﬁnitions below, as
discrete units and desist from using examples that can be
considered as pre-stages of hybrid entities.
Also in this traditional meaning living organisms and
machines have many common features. Both types of
entities convert energy into mechanical forces. Many
organisms and machines can move, all of them have an
overall body-plan, which means that they are composed of
different types of smaller subunits. Each single part of an
organism or a machine has a different structure from the
whole (in contrast to, e.g. a stone). Furthermore, organisms
as well as machines follow a speciﬁc program.
Machines
According to the Advanced Learner’s Oxford dictionary, a
machine is ‘‘1. (often in compounds) an apparatus with
several moving parts, designed to perform a particular task.
Machines may be driven by electricity, steam, gas etc. or
by human power […]. 2. a group of people that control an
organization, etc. or part of it […] 3. A person who acts
automatically without having to think or show any feel-
ings’’ (Hornby 1995). The ﬁrst part of this deﬁnition
describes the common and generally accepted usage of
this term (as we also use it in this article) according to
1 In order to give a clear argument we deﬁne in this essay the term
‘‘natural’’ as a counterpart to ‘‘artiﬁcial’’, meaning independent of
human plans and design. A natural process is thus one that proceeds
independently of a human plan, a natural object is one whose design
is independent of humans. A natural entity (belonging to the ‘‘natural
world’’) can be subjected to artiﬁcial processes, as it is constantly the
case for most human beings, and artiﬁcial entities do pass through
natural processes as for example all of them are governed by natural
laws.
2 This is for example the case when molecular- or cell biologists
speak of the ribosomal machinery, degradation machinery, cell cycle
machinery, etc.
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machines are thus used for sewing, washing machines for
washing, a CD player to listen to music, etc… In the sec-
ond and third parts of the deﬁnition, ‘‘machine’’ is used in a
metaphorical sense, which further clariﬁes its meaning. It
points out that machines act automatically and mechani-
cally and that there is no real independence or originality.
Design and production of machines are normally estab-
lished by human beings and machines exist because
of and for the purpose of humans, they are artifacts.
An ‘‘artiﬁcial machine’’ is thus a pleonasm because a
non-artiﬁcial machine seems to be a contradiction; a
machine is artiﬁcial per deﬁnition!
Living organisms
In the previously mentioned dictionary ‘‘organism’’ is
deﬁned as: ‘‘1. (a) a living being, esp a very small one, with
parts that work together (b) an individual plant or animal 2.
a system composed of parts which are dependent on each
other’’ (Hornby 1995). The word ‘‘organism’’ originates
from the same linguistic root as organize. (This meaning is
reﬂected in the deﬁnition by the ‘‘parts that work toge-
ther’’. Such an interaction can only function if the com-
position is well organized.) In this respect a machine could
also be considered to be an organism. However, according
to the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition organisms are alive.
Organisms are living beings, and as all living beings fulﬁll
the criteria suggested by the deﬁnition, namely to consist of
parts that work together (for example organs or organelles),
it can reciprocally also be said that all living beings are
organisms. ‘‘Living organism’’ is thus a pleonasm, simi-
larly to the artiﬁcial machine.
3 The second part of the
deﬁnition might extend the term to other systems besides
living beings. Whether this second usage of the word,
similarly to the case of the machine, is meant in a meta-
phorical sense or whether it should be considered a primary
meaning of this notion depends on the interpretation. As
mentioned above we are interpreting ‘‘organism’’ in this
essay in its ﬁrst meaning as a living entity.
Differences between the traditional concepts
of organisms and machines
From the preceding descriptions, it is evident that there are
important differences between machines and organisms.
We are comparing the two types of entities by consecu-
tively examining four main features in which they differ.
These four differences were determined by the compilation
of the lexical understanding of the two terms and the bio-
logical deﬁnition of organism.
4 We are using them as a
heuristic model to distinguish between the two types of
entities. Although we consider them the four most funda-
mental differences, it is in principle possible that this list
could be expanded by other properties. The four differ-
ences concern: (1) composition, (2) origin, (3) develop-
ment and (4) purpose of the two types of entities.
First, concerning the composition, living organisms are
cellular structures and each cell consists of organic mate-
rial.
5 They are regulated and controlled by a genome,
which according to the central dogma of molecular biology
is transcribed into RNA and translated into proteins. The
composition is not merely relevant for the appearance of
organisms but it is required or even responsible for most of
their features such as heredity, growth, development or
evolution. Machines, on the other hand, have up to now
been built from inorganic material, be it metal, plastic or
silicon. In contrast to the uniform structure amongst
organisms, the structural composition of machines varies
from one type to the other. The organization is not typical
for all machines, as for instance the inside of a sewing
machine has not much in common with that of a computer.
Second, the origin of organisms cannot be dated to a
speciﬁc moment. They have evolved over millions of years
by variation and selection and are still subject to these
processes, the evolutionary transition from one species to
another cannot be attributed to one moment. Machines, in
contrast, are designed and produced by human beings and
thus have a clearly deﬁned origin. New types of machines
arise when humans accomplish a novel design.
Third, and also related to their origins, the development
of the two types of entities are different. Organisms
develop, age and die, which implies programmed mor-
phological and material changes. By contrast, machines do
not develop or age in ways that involve programmed
morphological and material transformations. They subsist
in the form they have been built originally, without pre-
dicted changes during their existence. Furthermore, they
are not actively involved in their own genesis or the con-
tinuity of their kind.
This feature is closely linked to the fourth difference
between organisms and machines, namely their purposes.
As mentioned before, both types of entities seem to follow
a speciﬁc program. In case of the organism the genetic 3 Strictly speaking, ‘‘living organism’’ is not exactly the same type of
pleonasm as ‘‘artiﬁcial machine’’, because ‘‘living’’ and ‘‘organism’’
have the same extension, every living entity is an organism and every
organism is a living entity. This is not the case for ‘‘artiﬁcial
machine’’, since ‘‘artiﬁcial’’ has a wider meaning than ‘‘machine’’,
although every machine is indeed artiﬁcial most of the artiﬁcial
entities are not machines.
4 Biological ‘‘deﬁnitions’’ of life refer to certain biological criteria
such as metabolism, reproduction, growth, autopoiesis or evolution.
5 We are here only considering living organisms as we know them
from life on earth.
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‘‘ﬁtness’’ of its carrier. It includes the abilities of self-
production, self-organization and self-maintenance, which
according to several authors, are most characteristic fea-
tures of living organisms; they are summarized under the
term ‘‘autopoiesis’’ (Luisi 2003). Autopoietic systems thus
comprise or contain their own body plan and produce their
own structures from organic material without direct
external control or regulation. The fulﬁllment of the pro-
gram, which implies survival and reproduction, thus does
not serve any external purpose but is in the interest of the
organism itself and its species. In contrast, the program of
machines has been designed and written by human beings,
and its fulﬁllment serves human purposes. Nothing can be
in the interest of a machine but only in the interest of its
owner who proﬁts from it.
Given these differences between machines and organ-
isms, the two types of entities seem to be largely dissimilar.
Nevertheless, this article deals with two hybrid entities:
artiﬁcial organisms and living machines, exchanging the
adjectives of the two pleonasms ‘‘artiﬁcial machine’’ and
‘‘living organism’’; it thus examines organisms with fea-
tures of machines and vice versa. We ﬁrst want to address
traditional associations and expectations related to such
hybrid entities, illustrated by some well-known examples
from the science ﬁction literature.
Artiﬁcial or synthetic organisms
The terms ‘‘artiﬁcial’’ and ‘‘synthetic’’ do have closely
related meanings. Both adjectives refer to something that
has emerged by artiﬁcial synthesis. However, whereas
‘‘artiﬁcial’’ accentuates that the respective item is human-
made and thereby is opposed to ‘‘natural’’; ‘‘synthetic’’
emphasizes that the item underwent a procedure of syn-
thesis (implicating also that this is done by human beings).
Both terms have been used in connection to ‘‘life’’,
‘‘organism’’ and ‘‘cell’’. As the term ‘‘artiﬁcial life’’ usually
refers to other technologies more related to artiﬁcial
intelligence than synthetic biology [although there are
overlaps between AL and synthetic biology, particularly in
the ﬁeld of protocells (Bedau 2003)], we will generally use
the term ‘‘synthetic’’ unless we speciﬁcally want to point at
the contrast with ‘‘natural’’, in which case we will utilize
the term ‘‘artiﬁcial’’.
A synthetic organism would thus be an organism that
has been synthesized by human beings. It would, therefore,
not fulﬁll all the classical features of an organism anymore.
That said an entity that can grow, reproduce and develop
without further human intervention could be considered an
organism even when human beings have produced it. The
ﬁrst (the organic cellular composition) and the third
(the development) of the four differences would still be
characteristic for an organism, but not the second feature,
the origin. According to such an understanding Franken-
stein’s creature would be a synthetic organism.
Living machines
This brings us to the second type of hybrid entities, the
living machines. What would a living machine look like?
According to the roboticist Rodney Brooks ‘‘living
machines would be able to self-reproduce, ﬁnd their own
sources of energy, and repair themselves to some degree’’
(Brooks 2001). So far, nobody has succeeded in con-
structing such machines. If they existed, the origin of the
ﬁrst generation of these machines would remain human-
made and deﬁnable, also the composition could be that of
classical machines. However, by being able of self-repro-
duction, ﬁnding the energy required for survival and self-
reparation the machine would pursue its own interest. In
order for a robot to be considered alive, it needs to be
driven by its own interest and not by a human determined
program. Descriptions of living robots from the science
ﬁction genre illustrate this understanding of a living
machine. An example is the robot wall-e, known from the
ﬁlm with the same name, which has been programmed to
clean up human waste but falls in love with another robot.
These deliberations suggest that an ultimate synthetic
organism might be an organism as characterized by its
development, composition and purpose but not according
to its origin, whereas a living machine would be a machine
regarding its composition and its origin but not with respect
to its purpose. Fictitious examples of hybrid entities such as
Frankenstein or wall-e are challenging our ideas of a bor-
derline between organisms and machines but by their ﬁc-
titious character they are at the same time conﬁrming the
traditional categories, as they exist in the real world.
We will address next, how these two hybrid forms are
interpreted in synthetic biology.
Products of synthetic biology
As outlined in the beginning of this article, synthetic
biology is not a uniform discipline but an assembly of
different approaches uniﬁed by a similar goal, namely the
construction of new forms of life. In the following, three
different approaches will be introduced without the aim of
giving a complete picture of synthetic biology.
The protocell approach
According to R. V. Sole ´ et al. the protocell approach,
which they call ‘‘synthetic protocell biology’’ ‘‘aims at the
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an artiﬁcial cell system able to self-maintain, self-repro-
duce and potentially evolve’’ (Sole et al. 2007).
Ultimately such synthetic cells should have life-like
properties. However, this does not mean that they should
imitate life as we know it. So-called ‘‘minimal cells’’ or
‘‘protocells’’ could consist of the minimal numbers of
genes (see also below) that would be transcribed and
translated into the essential proteins. Alternatively, it is
conceivable that a minimal cell would be a RNA-cell in
which RNA would not only be the replicable carrier of
genetic information but also fulﬁll catalytic functions as a
ribozyme (Szostak et al. 2001). So far, self-maintaining,
self-producing and evolvable protocells have not been
realized, but different types of preliminary forms have been
constructed or simulated. According to an overview on
protocell research by Rasmussen et al., a protocell needs to
integrate three main components, namely containment,
metabolism and information (Rasmussen et al. 2009). For
containment, vesicles are used, which similarly to the cell
membrane, consist of a lipid bilayer. Metabolism includes
some type of energy conversion that drives catalysis in the
cell, and information is, for example, provided by a gen-
ome. Replicating vesicles or vesicles in which several types
of biological reactions take place have been constructed,
but several major challenges such as the coordination of
different cellular processes, for example, in cell division,
still need to be overcome before a real synthetic cell can be
built. However, once this has been achieved, this would
indeed be the production of a synthetic organism. Such a
synthetic cell would fulﬁll the compositional and func-
tional criteria of an organism but it would be created
artiﬁcially. The production of such a cell would indeed be
creation of life from non-living matter.
Synthetic genomics approach
Researchers of the synthetic genomics approach aim at
producing a minimal organism based on a synthetic mini-
mal genome, which is produced chemically. This genome
would comprise only the absolutely essential genes that are
required to survive under standardized lab conditions. Such
a minimal genome should then serve as a ‘‘chassis-gen-
ome’’ that can be expanded by additional genes for speciﬁc
functions that the organism is supposed to fulﬁll. In order
to produce an organism that carries and expresses such a
genome, a genome replacement methodology would be
applied, in which the genome of an existing bacterium
would be replaced by the synthetic chassis (or expanded
chassis) genome. To date, such chassis organisms have not
been produced. However, several of the single steps have
been performed: A possible composition of the minimal
genome has been proposed, the synthesis of a small bac-
terial genome has been achieved, and the principle of
genome transfer from one bacterium to another has been
established (Glass et al. 2006; Lartigue et al. 2007; Gibson
et al. 2008). The three different procedures have not been
combined yet, but the production of a chassis organism
seems to be realizable along this line.
Bioengineering approach
Bioengineers aim at producing programmable bacteria or
eukaryotic cells. They are designing elaborated biochemi-
cal pathways that they want to put into practice using a
reﬁned version of genetic engineering. The establishment
of a library of different types of standardized genetic ele-
ments and other DNA fragments to control gene expression
should facilitate the implementation of the designed path-
ways. In bioengineering, synthetic biology meets systems
biology. The comprehensive view on organisms as living
systems adopted by systems biology in order to explore the
function of natural organisms is taken by synthetic biology
in order to design for example an overall metabolism or
regulatory system. Some synthetic biologists in this ﬁeld
like to refer to computers to explain their approach
(Andrianantoandro et al. 2006). They want to design syn-
thetic biology products analogously to the hierarchical
structure of computers, which consist of modules with
different gates carried out by physical layers. Bioengineers
say that similarly, cells can be assembled from pathways of
different biochemical reactions carried out by proteins.
This comparison to computers seems to be more than a
mere analogy between machines and organisms; rather, the
bioengineered products should ultimately constitute real
machines. Standardization, decoupling and abstraction
should be introduced into biotechnology and result in
biological systems with predictable behavior (Endy 2005).
That these types of synthetic biology products are per-
ceived as machines is also supported by the name given to
the international student competition in synthetic biology
iGEM, which stands for international Genetically Engi-
neered Machine competition. The designing and fabricat-
ing aspects of these products deﬁne them as machines, but
it would be hard to deny these entities are alive. We are
thus confronted with a form of living machine.
The idea of bioengineered cells as a new type of
machine has interestingly also been suggested in nano-
biotechnology, where certain branches aim at producing
cell-like robots. R. A. Freitas is known for his utopian
models of nanorobots that behave like hyper-efﬁcient
erythrocytes, macrophages or other cells. In a review
article on nanomedicine Freitas describes, under the sub-
title of ‘‘biologic robots’’, certain ‘‘engineered bacterial
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designed to perform medical functions
6 (Freitas 2005).
Comparing the products of the different synthetic
biology approaches
Considering the three described synthetic biology products
at the interface between living and non-living matter, one
may wonder where these objects would be integrated in a
diagram of increasingly machine-like entities as depicted in
Fig. 1.
Synthetic cells would be composed of the same type of
molecules as natural organisms. However, their origin
would be fully artiﬁcial. Since these cells should be able to
maintain themselves, reproduce and evolve, their devel-
opment would be that of natural organisms in spite of their
artiﬁcial origin. Particularly interesting in this case is the
capability of those entities to evolve, which raises the
question whether in subsequent generations, at a point
when new structures and features have evolved, their origin
should still be considered artiﬁcial or whether the ‘‘pro-
cessing by evolution’’ would render them natural. Similarly
to natural cells, protocells in basic research would try to
secure their own survival and reproduction. However, later
versions of such cells would also be designed in order to
serve human purposes (Pohorille and Deamer 2002). Taken
together, composition and development of these entities
would be organism-like whereas their origin would be
machine-like. At least in basic research they would not be
designed to fulﬁll purposes for human beings and would
thus be comparable with living organisms.
Chassis organisms with a synthetic genome would also
consist of an organism-like composition and development
since they should be able to maintain themselves and
reproduce. Although the origin of their genomes would be
artiﬁcial, the origin of the chassis organism would not
be fully artiﬁcial because the synthetic genome would be
introduced into a natural cell. The chassis-function of such
a minimal organism implies that the minimal genome
should be expanded by genes required to fulﬁll certain
functions. This human-determined purpose would corre-
spond with that of a basic machine.
The products of bioengineering consist of the same
biological components as natural organisms. Also, their
development is largely similar to that of organisms.
However, ultimately they should be deterred from evolving
and performing functions that are not required for their
designed purposes. Therefore, the natural development of
these entities would be intentionally impaired. Whereas the
design of these organisms is clearly artiﬁcial, their material
origin is mainly natural as cytoplasm and genome of the
Fig. 1 The position of synthetic
biology products between
organisms and machines.
Arrows indicate the transition
from wild organisms to
machines designed for a speciﬁc
function. The images stand for
(1) wild organisms, (2)
domesticated organisms, (3)
genetically modiﬁed organisms,
(4) synthetic cells, (5) chassis
organisms, (6) genetically
engineered machines, (7)
intelligent machines, (8)
computers, (9) machines with
one speciﬁc function
6 The biorobots of R. A. Freitas are imagined products in which aims
of synthetic genomics are combined with bioengineering. This
example should not describe synthetic biology but merely illustrate
how synthetic organisms can be conceived as a hybrid between
organism and machine.
60 A. Deplazes, M. Huppenbauer
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feature of bioengineered cells is their purpose, which ide-
ally would be completely deﬁned by humans.
The summary of this comparison in Table 1 indicates
that for products of synthetic biology the features that
traditionally are used to distinguish between machines and
organisms are not correlating anymore. On the one hand, a
synthetic cell can be like a machine concerning its origin
but almost like a living organism according to its devel-
opment and purpose. A bioengineering product, on the
other hand, should functionally be like a machine but its
origin and development are still very close to that of
traditional organisms. Synthetic biologists perceive the
synthetic cell as a synthetic organism whereas the bioen-
gineering product is described as a living machine. Inter-
estingly, this different perception of the two products does
not reﬂect the assignment of machine-like or organism-like
properties as presented in Table 1, where both entities have
the same number of ? (machine-like features) and almost
the same number of - (organism-like features). This dis-
crepancy illustrates that the actual naming by synthetic
biologists ‘‘living machine’’ or ‘‘synthetic organism’’ does
not reﬂect the occurrence of machine-like or organism-like
features as represented by the table. Not only are charac-
teristics of machines and organisms mixed, but also an
entity with more organism-like features is not necessarily
perceived as an organism (as illustrated by the prevalence
of organism-like features for the bioengineering product).
The features that according to a traditional understanding
of the two types of entities were decisive for the perception
of an entity as a machine or an organism, respectively, do
not have this function anymore in case of the assignment of
synthetic biology products. The clear-cut difference of
what is perceived as a machine and what is perceived as an
organism is being blurred; hybrid entities seem to become
reality.
Implications of the nomenclature
Although the names given to synthetic biology products do
not inform us about the resemblance of the respective
entity to machines and organisms they are meaningful.
They reveal something about the objectives synthetic
biologists are striving for with the respective product as
well as the position and status that can or should be
assigned to it. Furthermore, the nomenclature will certainly
inﬂuence the public perception of synthetic biology prod-
ucts because it raises certain expectations and worries.
Aims of synthetic biologists
Discussing products of synthetic biology so far means
discussing aims of synthetic biologists because the
described versions of the respective products have not been
realized yet. To date there are neither fully controllable
bioengineered bacteria nor completely synthetic cells nor
minimal organisms carrying chassis genomes. Therefore, it
is particularly interesting to look at the names of future
synthetic biology products in respect to what they reveal
about their implication rather than about their physical
consistence. Already the deﬁnition of ‘‘machine’’ and
‘‘organism’’ that we have considered above comprised
metaphorical applications of the two terms, suggesting that
these terms evoke certain associations. By calling their
product an artiﬁcial or synthetic cell, scientists are
announcing that life no longer is only a natural process and
feature. They point out that the phenomenon ‘‘life’’ will be
fully understood by scientists, and this understanding
should enable the production of life. They thereby position
their product next to living organisms in spite of its arti-
ﬁciality. This distinguishes the achievement of producing
such an entity from all the other artiﬁcial objects.
Table 1 How products of synthetic biology are blurring the borderline of what we perceive as machines and organisms
Machine Bioengineering
product
Synthetic genomics
product
Synthetic
cell
Organism
Material ? ? -- -- -- --
Origin ?? - - ? ?? - -
Development ?? - - - - - - -
Purpose ?? ?? ? - - -
The table illustrates how similar the three synthetic biology products are compared to machines concerning the four categories: material, origin,
development and purpose. ?? indicates that the feature is machine-like; --stands for an organism-like feature; ? indicates that the respective
feature is not exactly as in machines, but more similar to a machine than to a natural organism; - indicates that the respective feature is more
similar to a natural organism than to a machine; -? indicates that the feature is about as much machine-like as organism-like. The assignment of
? and - values is largely generalized and there are certainly exceptions that tend to loose one or the other feature, this is particularly true for the
‘‘Machine’’ and ‘‘Organism’’ reference-categories. However, the detachment from the original feature is never as pronounced as in case of the
synthetic biology products
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conveys a completely different message. It points out that
these entities are controlled and produced by human beings
who can dispose of them freely and that these entities are
no longer part of the realm of nature.
Naming synthetic biology products
Analyzing which synthetic biology products are presented
as living machines and which of them as synthetic organ-
isms, it seems that the noun is determined by the purpose of
the entity, whereas the descriptive adjective represents the
origin.
The living machines should fulﬁll human purposes,
which is typical for machines but have the natural origin
characteristic for organisms. Synthetic cells in basic
research would be considered real synthetic organisms if
they are autopoietic, reproduce and evolve. In other words
similarly to natural organisms, they would promote their
own survival and reproduction, but their emergence and
origin would be artiﬁcial. This emphasis in the nomen-
clature is not compulsory. Theoretically, it would also be
possible to call a bioengineered bacterium a synthetic
organism or a protocell a living machine. The observation
that the ﬁrst version of nomenclature is applied tells us
something about the importance of the different features of
organisms and machines. Since the noun is decisive for the
categorization of the entity, the importance of the purpose
of the entity seems to outweigh its origin. This might
indicate a new emphasis in deﬁning living organisms and
life in general, which is in contrast to the ﬁctitious idea of
living machines as described at the beginning of this arti-
cle. The wall-e robot would ideally be similar to machines
concerning his origin and living concerning his purpose.
Position and status of the product and its relation
to nature
The focus on the purpose of synthetic biology products in
order to assign them either to organisms or machines is also
interesting concerning its moral status. There are various
theories on how living organism should be considered
morally. Mostly, the discussion involves the question what
kind of values can be assigned to organisms. Some com-
mentators argue living organisms have intrinsic value,
meaning that they are regarded as valuable in and of
themselves, independently of their usefulness for human
beings. Other positions state that at least lower forms of
living organisms do not have intrinsic but only instru-
mental value, which depends on their usefulness for human
beings. If the value of an organism is mainly set to be
instrumental this implies that the organism can be used for
human purposes. However, for positions arguing for an
intrinsic value of organisms, their instrumentalization
needs to be well justiﬁed in order to be morally acceptable
(O’Neill 2003). The purpose-oriented perception of entities
in synthetic biology avoids this discussion by deﬁning
entities as machines, as soon as the aspect of their function
for human purposes predominates. No one denies that it is
justiﬁed to instrumentalize machines, as it is part of their
deﬁnition that they perform a particular task for human
beings.
Public perception
Because of the traditionally clear-cut differences between
organisms and machines, the public perception of a product
will depend on how it is called and propagated. The
nomenclature of synthetic biology products thus might be a
factor promoting public reactions. As mentioned in the
beginning there are certain ideas and imaginations related
to the terms ‘‘synthetic organisms’’ and ‘‘living machines’’.
Versions of the two terms such as ‘‘genetically engineered
machines’’ or ‘‘artiﬁcial cells’’ as well as the name of the
full discipline ‘‘synthetic biology’’ are likely to raise
certain associations.
Conclusion
This comparison of organisms and machines and the
position of synthetic biology products with respect to these
two types of entities has illustrated that the borderline
between the two is continuously becoming blurred. This is
not only happening because of the metaphorical usage of
the terms (as indicated already in the deﬁnitions in the
beginning) and because of the imagination of hybrid enti-
ties but also because in novel entities such as products of
synthetic biology, features that used to be characteristic for
one group are combined with features of the other type of
entity. Synthetic cells with an artiﬁcial origin should
eventually have the composition and development and, in
some cases, the functions of organisms. Products of bio-
engineering, which are derived from living beings, should
follow the functionality and controlled development of
machines. The two groups ‘‘machines’’ and ‘‘organism’’
that we have treated as discrete classes in this essay have
been stretched to a lower extent by other technologies such
as breeding or genetic engineering. But with synthetic
biology novel entities seem not to stretch but to transgress
the borderline between organisms and machines, the
nomenclature of the synthetic biology products reﬂects this
transition.
The idea that there might be hybrids combining features
of machines and organisms is not new, but the notion of
how such beings would look like and how they would be
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123evaluated, is changing in the light of synthetic biology.
Synthetic organisms are not imagined as copies of human
beings but as new, minimal forms of life. Living machines
in synthetic biology are not imagined as mechanical beings
but as organisms that are fully controlled by human beings.
The difference in our conception of the two types of enti-
ties therefore gets more blurred. These new forms of life
will affect the concept and evaluation of life and the idea of
what constitutes a machine in society and in our culture. In
some decades the deﬁnitions of ‘‘machine’’ and ‘‘organ-
ism’’ in the mentioned dictionary might be expanded by
their usage in synthetic biology. This technology might
provide a new example how science inﬂuences culture. It
will be necessary to separate different aspects of our
understanding of life. In particular, ideas related to a ‘‘self
of living organisms’’, an ‘‘intrinsic value’’ or an ‘‘inviola-
bility of life’’ might not necessarily be appropriate for
simple forms of synthetic organisms. However, if and when
higher forms of life are discussed, the moral meaning of
their ‘‘self-interest’’ might have to be revisited and con-
trasted to machines. It thus seems that synthetic biology
will give us plenty of opportunity to discuss and adapt our
concept of life in the coming decades, and will be a chance
to reﬁne our biological and philosophical understanding of
this phenomenon.
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